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This paper uses recent data on a large cross-section of countries to study the determinants 
of corrupt activity.  The main contribution is to examine the effects of different types and 
severities of government regulations on corrupt activities. The results show that greater 
prosperity and democracy lead to less corrupt activity.  Variables representing the degree 
of fractionalization across three dimensions and least developed nations are statistically 
insignificant.  Having more regulation, including number of procedures and time involved 
across four categories (business startup, licensing, property registration, and taxation), 
leads to greater corruption.  More regulatory procedures, especially for business startups 
and property registrations, have the most corruption-enhancing effect.  Whereas lengthier 
procedures also generally spur corruption, there are important differences.  Finally, higher 
regulatory transactions costs do not seem to significantly impact corruption.  Policy impli-
cations are discussed. 
 
Keywords: Corruption, Business startup, Licenses, Property, Taxes, Fractionalization, De-
mocracy, Prosperity 
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Tässä paperissa tutkitaan monia maita kattavan tilastoaineiston avulla korruptioon vaikut-
tavia tekijöitä. Pääpaino on erilaisissa julkisen sektorin säännöksissä sekä siinä, mikä on 
näiden säännösten ankaruuden vaikutus korruptioon. Korkeampi elintaso ja demokratia 
vähentävät korruptiota. Yhteiskunnan fraktionaalisuutta edustavat muuttujat eivät ole tilas-
tollisesti merkitseviä. Taloudellisen sääntelyn ja erilaisten lupien määrä lisää korruptiota 
ainakin neljällä eri mittarilla (yrityksen perustaminen, lisenssit, kiinteistöomaisuuden rekis-
teröinti ja verotus) mitattuna. Etenkin yrityksen perustaminen ja rekisteröinti näyttävät al-
tistavan korruptiolle. Mitä pitempi aika erilaisiin viranomaisten toimenpiteisiin kuluu, sitä 
enemmän korruptiota toimet näyttävät synnyttävän, vaikka erilaiset toimenpiteet ovatkin 
tässä suhteessa hieman eri asemassa. Sääntelyn kustannusten nousu ei näytä vaikuttavan 
korruptioon. Työn lopussa tarkastellaan tulosten politiikkaimplikaatioita.   
 
Asiasanat: Korruptio, yritysten perustaminen, lisenssit, omaisuus, verot, fraktionaalisuus, 
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1  Introduction 
 
In recent years researchers have devoted considerable effort to understanding the causes 
and effects of corruption in response to heightened general interest and advances in re-
search production technologies.  The result is that the literature is beginning to come to 
some agreement on a few aspects.  For instance, among the umpteen different determinants 
of corruption, a few have been identified as relatively more significant (see Lambsdorff 
(2006), Serra (2006)).  Yet, the commonplace secrecy of corrupt deals and the quest for 
better measures of institutional complexity warrant continued efforts to improve our under-
standing of corruption.   
This study represents a small attempt to further our understanding of the causes of 
corruption.  Specifically, using a large cross-section of about 150 countries, we examine 
the effects of different types of regulatory bottlenecks and the associated transactions costs 
on the incidence of corruption.  Greater regulation is generally believed to increase corrup-
tion (see Johnson et al. (1998)).  In this regard, four key sets of regulations are identified: 
(i) regulations associated with starting a business; (ii) regulations pertaining to obtaining 
government licenses; (iii) regulatory obligations for registering property; and (iv) regula-
tions surrounding (business) taxation.  In each category, three types of country-specific 
bottlenecks are considered: number of regulatory procedures involved, average time in-
volved in completing a procedure, and the costs of each procedure.  Thus, the level of de-
tail captures the monetary and non-monetary severity of regulatory interventions.  A large 
number of potential regulatory hurdles and high costs of each hurdle (both in terms of time 
and money) induce the offering of bribes to avoid or reduce these bottlenecks.   
In the context of the extant literature, most studies of corruption suggest that greater 
economic freedom reduces corruption.  Based mainly on aggregate indices of competitive-
ness, there is empirical support in the literature for the proposition that greater competi-
tiveness reduces corruption (Goel and Nelson (2005)).  The present paper provides greater 
insight into the matter by using disaggregated measures of economic freedom.  Which 
types of regulatory bottlenecks contribute the most to corruption?  An understanding of 
this would support the claim that not all regulation is alike and might even indicate that 
some types of regulation actually reduce corruption.  The present study can also be seen as 
adding to the broader literature on the quality of government (La Porta et al. (1999), Rose-Rajeev K. Goel 
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Ackerman (1999)).  A relatively minor contribution of this study is the large number of 
countries in the sample.  Most related corruption studies cover about 100 nations – our re-
cent sample is larger by almost fifty percent. 
Greater red tape induces some firms/individuals to offer bribes to circumvent or ex-
pedite the process.  Figures 1 and 2, respectively, illustrate the variations across nations in 
number of procedures and average duration of a procedure across the four regulation types: 
startup of a business, obtaining licenses, registering property and paying taxes (see Table 1 
for details).
1  The wide variations in these bottlenecks among nations are evident.  Their 
relative impact on corruption, however, is less clear.    How these varying regulations im-
pact the level of corrupt activity is formally considered in the next section. 
 
 
2  Model, estimation and data 
 
The theoretical background for the present research may be seen as tied to the general lite-
rature on illegal behavior (Becker (1968)), the industrial economics of corruption (Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993, 1999)), and the theories surrounding the optimal level of red tape (Gu-
riev (2004) and Mendez and Sepulveda (2006)).  In a nutshell, the main point of the think-
ing on the economics of illegal behavior is that "rational" bribe-takers and bribe-givers 
weigh the relative costs and benefits of their illegal acts.  An industrial economics interpre-
tation would focus on the strategic interactions between bribe givers (suppliers of bribes) 
and bribe takers (demanders of bribes).  Such interactions influence the size of bribes and 
determine whether long term relations between the two parties develop.  Finally, the strand 
of the literature focusing on the nexus between corruption and degree of red tape considers 
the socially optimal level of red tape and, while generally stressing the corruption-
enhancing effects of red tape, allows for the possibility that some degree of red tape may 
be socially beneficial.   
All these considerations may be seen as forming the theoretical foundations of our 
empirical setup.  In general, we postulate that the level of corrupt activity in a nation (de-
noted by subscript i) is influenced by economic, social, institutional and regulatory factors.   
 
 
1  Note that the TAXtime duration from Table 1 was converted into days in Figure 2 to facilitate comparison 
with other categories. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
The formal estimated equation takes the following general form:  
Corruptioni = f (Prosperityi, Democracyi, Fractionalizationij, DEV, Startup bottlenecksi,  
Licensing bottlenecksi, Property bottlenecksi, Taxation bottlenecksi, Transactions 
costsik)      
       ( 1 )
     i = 1,…, 147 
     j = ETHNIC, LANG, RELG 
     k = startup, licensing, property, taxation 
 
The dependent variable is the corruption perceptions index (CPI in Table 1) from 
Transparency International.  This index has been widely used in corruption studies in the 
extant literature and provides fairly good cross-country comparisons of levels of corrupt 
activity – an activity that is inherently secretive due to the moral hazard issues involved 
(see Jain (2001), Lambsdorff (2006)).  Since the index is bounded between zero and ten, 
with higher numbers denoting more “clean” nations, we performed a log transformation (ln 
((10-CPI)/CPI)) that extends the index from minus infinity to plus infinity and (for ease of 
interpretation) assigns higher values to the more corrupt nations. 
Economic prosperity (GDPpc) and democracy (DEM) are included in nearly every 
study of corruption determinants and both are seen to reduce corruption (Serra (2006)).  
Greater economic prosperity raises the opportunity cost of being caught, for both bribe 
givers and bribe takers.  Prosperity may also be seen as a proxy for a country's level of lite-
racy.  A more educated populace is better aware of its rights and is thus less likely to be 
misguided by government officials into offering bribes.  It is also more likely to expose 
corrupt acts of others.  In our estimation, the GDPpc is used for 2005 (as opposed to most 
other variables for 2007), to make it somewhat pre-determined.  The civil liberties and free 
press in a democratic society raise the possibility of exposure of corrupt officials and are 
likely to act as checks against corruption.  Moreover, corrupt public officials in democra-
cies face the threat of not being reelected.  The DEM variable is constructed by adding the 
widely used Freedom House indices of free press and civil liberties.
2 
 
2  Note that the DEM variable is constructed so that higher values imply less democracy (Table 1).  This 
should be kept in mind in interpreting the positive sign on the resulting coefficient in Table 2. Rajeev K. Goel 
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A lack of homogeneity of a country's population can affect the formation of trust 
and may influence the incidence of corruption (see Fisman and Gatti (2002), Lambsdorff 
(2006), Paldam (2002)).  Monetary inducements (bribes) may be necessary when oral 
communications between parties in an exchange cannot be trusted.  To account for this, we 
include measures of fractionalization across three dimensions: ethnic fractionalization 
(ETHNIC); linguistic fractionalization (LANG); and religious fractionalization (RELG), 
(see Alesina et al. (2003) for details on constructing these variables).  Here the three frac-
tionalization indices capture more detail than the composite ethno-linguistic fractionaliza-
tion indices used elsewhere. 
Ceteris paribus, less developed nations would likely have underdeveloped institu-
tions, and the differences are not easily quantifiable (Graeff and Mehlkop (2003), Knack 
and Keefer (1995)).  Yet, these differences could significantly influence the prevalence of 
corruption.  To account for this, we include a dummy variable, DEV, which identifies the 
least developed nations in our sample, as per the United Nations. 
The literature has largely considered the influence of aggregate government size on 
corruption, and the findings are mixed.  Specifically, cross-country studies have generally 
found a larger government to be associated with less corruption (Goel and Nelson (2005)) - 
consistent with the notion of a benevolent government (Shleifer and Vishny (1999)).  On 
the other hand, country-specific studies of corruption find support for the grabbing hand of 
the government (Shleifer and Vishny (1999)): larger governments indulge in more corrupt 
activity (Goel and Nelson (1998)).  The present study provides additional insights into 
government activity by using a disaggregated approach that is able to qualitatively distin-
guish among the types and severities of government interventions.  The related regulation 
data are from the World Bank and the four categories of regulation (business startup regu-
lations, licensing requirements, property registration procedures and taxation) considered 
here do not merely count the number of different regulations; they possess subtle qualita-
tive differences that can crucially impact the bribe-offering and bribe-generating propensi-
ties.  For instance, businesses at the startup stage do not have much sunk investment and 
some may be dissuaded from starting a business if the initial government formalities are 
highly drawn out (see Djankov et al. (2002)).  In addition, formalities associated with busi-
ness startup, property registration and licensing are generally rather sporadic; so that many 
business people rarely have to confront them. On the other hand, tax payments are regular BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
and predictable.  There is also some learning (for both bribe takers and bribe givers) when 
a type of interaction is repeated, as is the case between tax payers and tax collectors.  This 
difference might determine whether corrupt relational contracts develop between bribe tak-
ers and bribe givers (Lambsdorff and Teksoz (2004)).  Finally, some procedures, such as 
licensing requirements, tax rates, and property registration guidelines, are predetermined 
and are generally not at the disposal of a (front-line) bureaucrat (and potential bribe taker) 
to arbitrarily change in a short time period.  However, a government official can drag her 
feet to induce a larger bribe by lengthening the time it takes to meet some formalities.  We 
consider this possible reverse causality later in the paper. 
Two bottlenecks under each intervention category are included, to see whether 
greater red tape increases corruption.  These are the number of procedures involved and the 
average number of days it takes to complete a procedure.
3  One may view the two as se-
quential stages of the regulatory process.  The number of procedures might be due to cross-
oversights by various government agencies, and the time associated with each procedure 
might have to do with country-specific institutional norms.  In our sample, the number of 
procedures in starting a business (STARTp) ranged from 2 (Australia, New Zealand) to 20 
(Equatorial Guinea), while the range for the number of tax payments (TAXpay) was from 
1 (Maldives) to 124 (Belarus).  Further, the average time for a licensing procedure 
(LICNd) was about 228 days, and it took on average 332 hours for businesses to pay (also 
including tax preparation time) all taxes (TAXtime). 
Finally, regulatory costs are included as the average costs of different procedures 
and the overall tax rate.  These costs are alternately associated with business startup, ob-
taining licenses, registering property or tax payments.  Higher costs, ceteris paribus, make 
the payment of bribes more attractive, especially if the bribes enable the lowering of over-
all costs for the bribe-giver (see Shleifer and Vishny (1999)).  In our sample, the average 
cost of registering property was 6.5 percent of property value and the average corporate tax 
rate was about fifty percent. 
The data employed are for the year 2007, or the closest year available.  The variable 
definitions, summary statistics and data sources are provided in Table 1.  We turn next to a 
discussion of the estimation results. 
 
3  In the case of taxation, the corresponding measures are the number of tax payments and the time (in hours) 
it takes to pay taxes. Rajeev K. Goel 
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3  Results and discussion 
 
Five different variations of the general model in (1) were estimated.  All equations were 
estimated by OLS using STATA, and the t-statistics based on robust standard errors are 
reported in Table 2.  The overall fit of all the models is quite good, as signified by the sta-
tistically significant F-value and an R
2 ≥ 0.80 in all cases.  The following additional points 
may be noted regarding the estimation results. 
•  Greater economic prosperity consistently lowers corruption in all cases in Table 2.  
The resulting coefficient is negative and statistically significant.  This reinforces the 
finding in the extant literature that as a nation becomes more prosperous the level 
of corrupt activity declines.
4 
•  Greater democracy is also associated with less corruption across the board, suggest-
ing that democratic institutions act as a check against corrupt activities.  Again, this 
finding supports the general finding in the literature - with a larger sample of coun-
tries here. 
•  The three fractionalization measures capturing intra-country socio-economic differ-
ences in ethnicity, religion and language fail to attain statistical significance at any 
meaningful level.  Interestingly, however, ethnic and religious fractionalization 
have opposite signs - the sign of the latter suggesting lower corruption.  The effect 
of ethnic fractionalization on corruption has also been found to be insignificant 
elsewhere (Fisman and Gatti (2002)). 
•  The estimated coefficient on DEV is statistically insignificant in all cases.  Any 
significant differences in the prevalence of corruption in the least developed na-
tions, if they exist, do not become evident with the inclusion of a dichotomous vari-
able.  Alternately, the other control variables employed might adequately capture 
these differences. 
•  A greater number of regulatory procedures lead to more corruption.  In other 
words, the coefficients on STARTp, LICNp, PROPp and TAXpay are all positive, 
and statistically significant in most cases.  This finding is consistent with the notion 
 
4  It could, however, be the case that the very nature of corruption (i.e., grand versus petty corruption) might 
be different in wealthy and poor nations.  Unfortunately, the quality of the available data does not permit us 
to focus on this aspect. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
that more regulatory hurdles present more opportunities to collect rents and with 
the “tollbooth theory” of Djankov et al. (2002). 
•  Due to the implicit costs involved, a longer average duration of each procedure also 
contributes positively to corruption.  Drawn out procedures prompt agents with 
higher discount rates to offer bribes.  However, the coefficients on STARTd are 
statistically insignificant, and are positive and significant in one of the three in-
stances in regard to TAXtime.  The statistical insignificance of STARTd is plausi-
ble if one considers the fact that at the startup stage a drawn-out procedure induces 
some startups to withdraw and, in the absence of substantial sunk costs, undermines 
the ability of bribe takers to garner bribes. 
•  Higher transactions costs associated with startups, licensing, property registrations 
and taxes do not seem to appreciably affect corruption, as the coefficients of cost 
variables (STARTc, LICNc, PROPc and TAXrate) are generally insignificant.  This 
result seems plausible if one considers that higher procedure costs might not direct-
ly lead to corruption, but indirectly might induce bribes, so that the overall payment 
by the bribe giver is smaller.  For instance, our measure of PROPc is the property 
registration cost as a percent of property value.  It could be the case that a prior 
bribe payment induces the bureaucrat to undervalue the property, so that the per-
centage cost of property value is (artificially) rather low.  Shleifer and Vishny 
(1999) have alluded to this possibility, but this indirect channel might be difficult to 
separate in a quantitative analysis. 
 
Overall, our analysis of determinants of corruption using recent data for a fairly 
large number of countries provides largely intuitive, but new, findings.  The results regard-
ing the effects of prosperity and democracy accord with the literature.  The degree of frac-
tionalization across three dimensions and the least-developed-nations variables are statisti-
cally insignificant.  More regulatory procedures lead to greater corruption across different 
interventions.  Whereas lengthier procedures also generally spur corruption, important dif-
ferences exist in this regard, which are plausible given the qualitative dissimilarities across 
regulation types.
5  Finally, higher transactions costs do not seem to significantly impact 
 
5  In interpreting the coefficients on taxation variables, one should bear in mind that, of the four categories of 
intervention considered, taxes are most unlikely to be uniformly applicable to all of the population, since Rajeev K. Goel 
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corruption, which suggests measurement issues or the possibility that bribe givers are 
somehow able to circumvent/dilute this stage. 
Finally, to account for the possible two-way causality between some regulation 
forms and corruption, we focus on this aspect.  In other words, some regulation might be 
endogenous to the generation of more bribes (Guriev (2004), Johnson et al. (1998)).  How-
ever, Lambsdorff (2006, p. 8) cautions that the causality between regulation and corruption 
“may be difficult to ascertain”.  Among the four categories of regulation considered here, 
one can envision that while the number of procedures and tax rates might be predetermined 
at a point in time for both (corrupt) parties, the length or duration of execution of some of 
the formalities may be somewhat endogenous.
6  A government official might drag her feet 
to solicit bribes and/or to increase the size of payments.
7  Therefore, we consider four sep-
arate variations with STARd, LICNd, PROPd, and TAXtime, alternately used as endogen-
ous variables.  In these two-stage least squares regressions, the instruments were literacy 
rate (LIT), country population (POP), and a dummy variable identifying transition coun-
tries (TRAN).
8  While the results for economic prosperity and democracy reinforced our 
earlier findings in Table 2, the coefficients on STARd, LICNd, PROPd, and TAXtime 
were all statistically insignificant.  The corresponding results are not reported here, but are 
available upon request.  The concluding section follows. 
  
 
certain segments are tax exempt or tax officials might have some leeway in deciding the assessed value.  On 
the other hand, property registration, licensing requirements, and business startup procedures are generally 
implemented across the board with few exceptions. 
6  Some governments have recognized this aspect and have even tried to make the duration exogenous.  For 
instance, the Indian government has placed maximum limits on the time taken to issue passports and other 
identification documents. 
7  From an industrial organization perspective, one can imagine some upper bound on how long a government 
official can procrastinate.  Excessively lengthy delays in completing regulatory formalities would spur some 
agents to operate outside the law without permits or permissions.  In the event of apprehension, these agents 
would seek to bribe someone to reduce or avoid punishment.  And that someone is unlikely to be the same 
(original) government official.  This threat of losing some “customers” places some constraints on the rent-
seeking behavior. 
8  See Table 1 for details about these variables. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




4  Concluding remarks 
 
This paper uses recent data on a large cross-section of countries to examine the determi-
nants of corrupt activity.  The main contribution is to examine the effects of different types 
and severities of government regulations on corrupt activities. The three fractionalization  
indices capture more detail than the composite ethno-linguistic fractionalization indices 
used elsewhere.  Using a well-known index of corruption perceptions across nations, our 
analysis of determinants of corruption provides generally intuitive, but new, findings.  The 
results regarding the effects of prosperity and democracy show that both these factors lead 
to reduced corrupt activity.  The degree of fractionalization across the three dimensions 
considered and the least-developed-nations variables are statistically insignificant.  
Turning to the main focus of this study, more regulatory bottlenecks, including the 
number of procedures and the time involved across four categories (business startup, li-
censing, property registration, and taxation), lead to greater corruption across different in-
terventions.  Addressing the question posed in the introduction, it seems that a larger num-
ber of procedures, especially for business startup and property registrations, has the great-
est corruption-enhancing effect.  Whereas lengthier regulatory procedures also generally 
spur corruption, important differences exist in this regard which are plausible given the qu-
alitative dissimilarities across regulatory modes.  Finally, higher regulatory transactions 
costs do not seem to significantly impact corruption, which suggests measurement issues 
or the possibility that bribe givers are somehow able to circumvent this stage. 
From a policy perspective, we find support for the notion that corruption declines as 
a nation achieves greater prosperity and as democratic institutions take root.  Any govern-
mental efforts aimed at homogenization of the population across ethnic, linguistic or reli-
gious dimensions do not appear to generate payoffs on the corruption front.  Nor do uni-
quely underdeveloped institutions in the least developed nations appear to have a major 
impact on corruption in these instances.  It seems that non-monetary costs of regulation, 
including the number and length of regulatory procedures, are relatively more damaging 
vis-à-vis corruption than are the direct costs of regulation.  This finding is interesting in 
light of the fact that, whereas taxation has received a fair bit of attention in terms of its link 
with corruption (see Jain (2001)), our research shows that non-tax regulations have a more 
pronounced impact on corrupt activity.  This supports the view that not all regulation is Rajeev K. Goel 
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alike, even in terms of its impact on corruption.  Finally, whereas various governments are 
trying to streamline some procedures, technology, especially the Internet, might turn out to 
be a useful ally in the fight against corruption, by eliminating/reducing direct contact be-
tween bribe takers and bribe givers and by reducing the number of tollbooths.  This is an 
issue worthy of future investigation. 
   BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Table 1   Variable Definitions, Summary Statistics and Data Sources 
 
Variable Definition 
(mean; std. dev) 
Source 
CPI  Corruption Perceptions Index, 2007 
(10 highly clean, 0 highly corrupt) 
(3.98; 2.09) 
I
GDPpc  GDP per capita (PPP 2000 international $), 2005 
(9649.41; 10498.98) 
II
STARTp  Number of procedures required to register a firm, 2007 
(9.15; 3.35)  
III
STARTd  Average time spent on a procedure (days), 2007 
(44.09; 61.75) 
III
STARTc  Official cost of each procedure (% of GNI per capita), 2007 
(61.35; 112.80) 
III
LICNp  Number of procedures to build a warehouse, 2007 
(18.47; 7.16) 
IV
LICNd  Average time of a (warehouse) procedure (days), 2007 
(228.37; 149.49) 
IV
LICNc  Official cost of a (warehouse) procedure (% of per capita income), 2007 
(1061.65; 5087.52) 
IV
PROPp  Number of procedures to legally register property, 2007 
(6.23; 2.56) 
V
PROPd  Time spent in completing (property) procedures (days), 2007 
(81.6; 93.03) 
V
PROPc  The costs of property registry, notaries, public agencies or lawyers 
(% of property value), 2007 
(6.50; 5.50) 
V
TAXpay  Number of tax payments per year, 2007 
(34.14; 21.83) 
VI
TAXtime  Time to prepare, file and pay (or withhold) the corporate income tax, the 
value added tax and social security contributions (hours), 2007 
(331.96; 328.25) 
VI
TAXrate  Total taxes and mandatory contributions payable by businesses, 2007 
(% of profits) 
(50.82; 39.24) 
VI
ETHNIC  Ethnic fractionalization 
(0.44; 0.26) 
VII
LANG  Language fractionalization  
(0.40; 0.28) 
VII
RELG  Religious fractionalization 
(0.43; 0.23)  
VII
POP  Population, 2005 
(3.59E+07; 1.32E+08) 
IIRajeev K. Goel 
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LIT  Literacy rate 2006 (% of literate population above age 15) 
(79.10; 20.75) 
II
TRAN  Dummy variable = 1 if a country is a transition economy, 0 otherwise 
(0.15; 0.36) 
VIII




DEM  Sum of a country’s political rights and civil liberties scores, 2007 
(higher score means less democratic) 
(6.71; 3.83) 
IX




I  http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007 
II  2007 World Development Indicators CDROM 
III  http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/StartingBusiness/ 
IV  http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/DealingLicenses/ 
V  http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/RegisteringProperty/ 
VI  http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/PayingTaxes/ 
VII  Alesina et al. (2003) 
VIII  http://www.unpan1.un.org 
IX  http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw08launch/FIW08Tables.pdf 
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Table 2   Regulatory Bottlenecks, Transactions Costs and Corruption 
(Dependent variable: ln((10-CPI)/CPI) 
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STARTp  0.036** 
(2.8) 










LICNp  0.013** 
(2.3) 










PROPp  0.033** 
(2.3) 










TAXpay  0.003** 
(2.0) 


























       
N  147 146 147 146 146 
F-value  45.9** 37.3** 39.5** 36.1** 33.6** 
R
2  0.83 0.82 0.80 0.84 0.84 
Note: Details on variables are provided in Table 1.  Absolute values of (robust) t-statistics are in parenthes-
es.  A constant term was included in all models, but to save space corresponding results are not presented.  
Note that higher values of DEM mean less democracy. 
** denotes statistically significant at 5% level and * at 10% level.Rajeev K. Goel 
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Figure 1   Number of Regulatory Procedures 


















Figure 2  Duration of Regulatory Procedures 
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